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Abstract 
 
The outcomes of WTO negotiations under the Doha round, Hong Kong development round 
and the changing European Union regulations are likely to place new hurdles on the marine 
exports emerging from developing economies like India. In the light of the above, we 
attempt to discuss the impact of WTO-GATS on the Indian Marine Trade and Service 
industry, analyze the challenges faced by the developing countries, and suggest way-outs to 
respond them. Many other WTO-GATS related aspects have repercussions on the marine 
exports from the developing countries in Asia and India in particular; namely the outcomes 
from the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), the relation between trade rules and 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), Technical Assistance and Capacity 
Building (TA & CB) and the provisions for Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). The 
impact of GATS and the implications on Indian marine trade & services are specifically 
assessed in context of Tariff barriers, Non-tariff measures, Subsidies and Eco-labeling. 
Relevant policy implications follow the issues discussed. 
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Introduction 
The subject matter of World Trade Organization-General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (WTO-GATS) is incredibly broad as the term 'Service' is defined vaguely and 
tautologically in the agreement, so as to potentially include any and every activity. The focus 
of the GATS is on the liberalization and deregulation of the services sector and covers in its 
gamut over 160 service sectors. At stake are services such as financial services, 
telecommunications, distribution, transport, and issues include the movement of natural 
persons (i.e. temporary migration), cross-border supply, consumption abroad, environmental 
/ health safety hazards and commercial presence, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005). These sectors 
constitute the target of deep liberalization and the next frontier for corporate-led 
globalization. The GATS came into force in 1995, and negotiations to further liberalize 
international trade in services started in 2000. The Doha Ministerial Declaration incorporated 
these negotiations into the "single undertaking" of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), 
WTO (2003). Compared to issues related to Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and 
subsidies, other fisheries related trade issues have been less covered in the literature and by 
research. Although the outcomes of WTO-GATS negotiations are likely to affect fisheries 
trade, literature assessing the link between the two is very scant. The outcomes of WTO 
negotiations under the Doha round, Hong Kong development (HK) round (December 2005) 
and the changing European Union (EU) regulations are likely to place new hurdles on the 
marine exports emerging from developing countries.  
In the light of the above issues, we attempt to discuss the impact of WTO-GATS on 
the Indian fishing industry, analyze the challenges faced by the developing countries, 
specifically India and suggest way-outs to respond to them. The paper is organized in 5 
sections. Section 2 discusses the coverage of Marine trade under the WTO regime. Section 3 
assesses the composition of marine trade in Indian export basket. Section 4 examines the 
impact and the implications of the same on marine trade with respect to tariff measures, non-
tariff measures, subsidies and eco-labeling whilst, section 5 concludes. 
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2. Marine Trade and the Developing Economies  
Marine products, on account of their health attributes and high unit value, are 
claimed to be one of the fastest moving commodities in world markets. In the context of 
WTO-GATS, the nature of linkage between trade performance and environmental measures 
has become a major concern for the developing countries and export of marine products are 
considered to be the most environmentally sensitive products in the international market. 
Within the WTO, fish is treated as an industrial product within a potentially free global 
market to be addressed within the NAMA negotiations, having been excluded from 
agriculture negotiations. During the Uruguay round, fisheries were left out of the Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA) at the insistence of some EU countries that benefited from the EU 
fisheries subsidy regime. As a result, fisheries-related issues are covered by various other 
agreements. Most notably, fisheries subsidies fall under the discipline of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). The Doha and the HK round proceedings 
include a number of issues of particular importance to international trade in fish and fishery 
products, i.e. fisheries subsidies, market access, environmental labeling, the relationship 
between WTO trade rules and environmental agreements. The main areas up for negotiation 
were tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions under the negotiating group on NAMA and 
specific mention of a reduction of fisheries subsidies under the WTO negotiating ‘Group on 
Rules’. Apart from the above many other WTO-GATS related issues have repercussions on 
the marine exports from the Asian countries, namely the outcomes from the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM); the current process of clarification on the impact of eco-
labels on trade; the relation between trade rules and Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs); Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (TA & CB); and the provisions for 
Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). 
 
Table 1. Global Trends in Fishery Exports & Imports (US $ Billion) 
1976 2001 Region Exports Imports Exports Imports 
 World 7.98 8.84 56.10 60.26 
 Developing Economies 2.94 1.19 28.03 10.66 
 LIFDC 0.96 0.44 10.82 3.16 
 Developing / World (%) 37 13 50 18 
 LIFDC / World (%) 12 5 19 5 
Note:  (LIFDC) Low-Income Food Deficit Countries   
Source: WTO (2002) 
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Globally, fish has become a highly traded commodity, with 38 % (live weight 
equivalent) of total fisheries product being traded internationally in foreign markets, 
Vannuccini (2004). In terms of overall merchandise production and trade, the global share of 
developing countries was 37.5 % in 2001 but their share in global fish exports was over 50 
% (See Table 1), WTO (2002). The livelihoods of approximately 150 Million (mln.) people 
depend on fisheries, aquaculture and associated activities and over 20 % of the world’s 38 
million fulltime fishers earn less than US$ 1 per day, World Bank (2006). According to 
Delgado et al., (2003), global capture production of food fish has rapidly increased from 
44.5 mln. tonnes in 1973 to 64.5 mln. tonnes in 1997. The vast majority of this production 
(over 90 % in 1997) has come from marine fisheries. During this period, the production of 
developed countries as a whole declined by about 3.6 mln. tonnes, whilst production in the 
developing world increased at an average annual rate of 3.4 %. The above evidence mirrors 
an overall shift in production towards developing countries away from developed countries. 
Part of this shift is probably the consequence of the establishment of 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) that allow coastal nations to claim exclusive fishing rights. At the 
same time, capture fisheries is an industry in crisis as the natural resource limits of the 
oceans, coastal regions, and many inland water bodies have been reached, World Bank 
(2004). According to FAO estimates, 25 % of the world’s major fisheries are over fished, 
and 40 % are fully fished, resulting in declining fish stocks and ecological change, World 
Bank (ibid).  
As per the FAO statistics, developing countries like China, Thailand, Vietnam, Chile, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, India, Peru and South Korea are the main exporters in terms of value of 
fisheries products during the 2000-2005 periods. At the same time, with 34 % of the export 
value (i.e. this may include intra EU trade), the EU is globally the most important exporter 
with Norway, USA, and Canada being other major players amongst developed countries, 
Lem (2004). Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany and France are the 
principal EU exporters. The export value of internationally traded fish and fisheries products 
was US$ 58 Billion (bln.) in 2002, exceeding the combined value of net exports of rice, 
coffee, sugar, and tea, World Bank website January 2006). Developed countries absorb 80 % 
of the value of world imports, with Japan, USA, and the EU being the principal destinations. 
Whilst LIFDC’s account for 20 % of fishery exports in value terms in 2002, the share of all 
developing countries combined in fishery exports was 49 % by value and 55 % by quantity 
(Lem, 2003; quoted in Bostock et al, 2004). The net receipts of foreign exchange (i.e. export 
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minus import values) for fishery commodities by developing countries increased from 
US$4.0 billion in 1982 to US$17.4 billion in 2002, Vannuccini (2004).  
 
3. Indian Marine Trade & Services  
In India, till late seventies, the export of marine products mainly consisted of dried 
items like dried fish, dried shrimp, shark fins and fish maws etc. However, later there was a 
decline in the export of dried marine products, and subsequently the exports of processed 
items continued to make steady progress in marine trade. The markets for Indian marine 
foods were initially confined to Singapore, Sri Lanka and Myanmar to a great extent. When 
frozen and canned items figured increasingly in the export basket, USA, France, Canada, 
Japan and Australia became the important markets for Indian marine products. During 
1980’s canned items slowly disappeared and frozen items became the prominent ones in 
India’s seafood trade. India has the seventh largest capture fishery, and is second in 
importance in terms of aquaculture production. It is also a significant exporter (See Figure 
1), although per capita consumption of fish is low (5 kg per capita). The export of marine 
products grew to be one of the important item of India’s exports from a 40.4 US$ in 1970-71 
to US$ 1320.5 mln. in 2003-04 accounting for approximately 2.08 % of the total export from 
India. In 2003-2004 it has a share of 17.83 % in total agricultural exports, Reserve Bank of 
India (2004).  
Indian seafood exports are less than the global average, with about 12 % of its total 
fish production (wet weight equivalent) entering world trade. As a share of the marine fish 
production it is about 25 % of the total marine fish production. India has a coastal population 
of 370 mln. people or 36 % of the country's total population, DOD (2002) and about 6.7 mln. 
people depend on fisheries for a livelihood, Government of India (2001). This includes 
roughly 725, 000 full-time, and an equal number of part-time, fishermen engaged in fishing 
operations and over one mln. people engaged in pre and post-harvest activities. While 48 % 
of full-time fishermen are on the East Coast of India, 35 % are on the West Coast, and the 
remaining 17 % are spread over other states and union territories. There are also about 
300,000 people employed directly in the shrimp aquaculture sector and about 700,000 people 
in ancillary units, AAI (2002). 
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Fig 1. Evolution of Fish and Fishery Product Exports from India, 1960–2002 
Source: Reserve Bank of India (2004) 
 
India is currently the fourth largest fish producer in the world after China, Peru and 
Japan. Marine products form a bulk of the exports of agricultural products. More than 3 % of 
India’s exports are marine products. Although tariff levels have been reduced recently (from 
an average of 60% to 35%), these remain high even by the standards of other major Asian 
economies. From 1951 to 2003 India's fish production increased eight-fold from 7.52 lakh 
tonnes in 1950-51 to 6.2 lakh tonnes in 2002-2003, accounting for over 5 % (approx.) of the 
world’s total fish production, Directorate of Economics & Statistics (2004). In the realms of 
food production, the rate of growth of Indian fish production is second only to that of wheat. 
Over 70 % of total fish production of India is sold fresh in the domestic market, about 11 % 
are dried or salted, and about 6 % are converted to fishmeal, Government of India (2001).  
The impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement and the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
adopted by WTO Members in 1995 is clearly depicted through the above figure. 
 
4. Implications of WTO-GATS on India Marine Industry  
 The exports of inland and marine capture fishery products are of integral importance 
to government revenues and income and employment generation in India. Indian fisherman 
and fishery exporters face complex negotiations at the WTO-GATS level on tariffs and 
fishery subsidies, and bilateral and regional negotiations with the EU in the formulation of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs). In 
addition, they need to comply with increased food safety standards. The impact of GATS 
and the implications on Indian marine trade & services are assessed in context of Tariff 
Measures, Non-tariff measures, Subsidies and Eco-labeling.  
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4.1 Market Access – Tariff Measures  
Tariffs on fish and fishery products are generally quite higher in developing countries 
posing problems to the development of international trade. After the completion of the 
Uruguay round, the average weighted import tariffs on fish products were reduced to 4.5% in 
developed countries, Lem (2004). Although this may seem quite low, the average hides a 
number of very high tariffs for selected species and products (tariff peaks), as well as cases 
of tariff escalation where processed or value added fish products are subject to higher duty 
than unprocessed fish. Tariffs on primary fish commodities have declined significantly in 
developed countries and have decreased even in the developing countries of Asia, where 
they were previously much higher than in developed countries.  
 
Table 2.  Reductions in Average Tariffs for Fisheries Imports in Select Asian 
Countries 
Share of c.i.f value (percent) Country Tarrif before WTO Tarrif after WTO 
China 1991 47 2001 11-23 
Thailand 1995 60 1999 5-30 
Philippines 1994 10-60 2000 2-15 
India 1993-94 60 2002-03 35 
Bangladesh 1991-92 59 200-2001 28 
Source:  Dey et al., 2002 
 
While average tariff levels have declined (See Table 2), it should be noted both that 
most fish trade is in processed products of some sort, and that developed countries generally 
maintain higher tariff rates on processed fish commodities than on chilled fresh fish, a case 
of “tariff escalation” shown in Table 3. Yet even the tariff rates for processed products are 
fairly low (compared with meat out of quota, for example), and it is not plausible that tariffs 
are or will be a major constraint on the growth of fish exports from developing countries. 
Import duties in developed country markets continue therefore to present a barrier to 
processing and economic development in the fishery industries in many developing 
countries, and also to developed countries outside the large trade areas, for example Non-EU 
members (Lem, ibid).  
Tariff cuts on fish products would mean a reward to those who engage in 
economically ‘efficient’ mass exploitation and hasten the depletion of the ocean’s resources. 
Sustainable local suppliers would be forced out of their domestic market and the rape of the 
fisheries would intensify. Developed countries often have zero or relatively low levels of 
tariffs on fish, but there are cases of escalation with some peaks. EU rates are higher than in 
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many developed countries i.e. on average are around 10%, but zero rates apply for ACP 
(African Caribbean and Pacific) and LDC states. As such the issue of concern to developing 
country exporters depends on their current exemption status and hence potential change in 
competitiveness arising from further liberalization (e.g. the extension of tariff exemptions to 
non-ACP and LDC states which may radically alter competition in the supply of EU 
markets.  
 
Table 3: Tariff Escalation for Some Developed-Country Fisheries Imports 
Share of border c.i.f. value (percent) 
European Union Japan Product 
Conventional GSP MFN GSP 
Skipjack 
     Fresh 22 0 3.5 3.5 
     Canned 24 0 9.6 6.4 
Mackerel 
     Fresh 20 0 0 0 
     Processed 25 0 9.6 7.2 
Scallops 
     Fresh 8 2.8 10 7.2 
     Processed 20 7 9.6 7.2 
Crabs/Lobsters 
     Fresh 10 8.2 7 7 
     Processed 20 7 6.7 6.7 
Note: GSP and MFN denote General Scheme of Preference and the Most Favored Nation status respectively. 
Source: Dey et al., (2002). 
 
The U.S. Seafood Regulation in December 1995 has mandated every processor and 
importer to comply with HACCP from December 1997. To ensure compliance with its food-
safety regulations, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) require importers to meet 
one of two conditions. First, importers may obtain seafood from countries with voluntary 
agreements with the FDA. These agreements may document that the countries’ seafood 
safety systems are equivalent to or in compliance with those of the U.S. Second, if these 
agreements do not exist, importers must have records demonstrating that foreign firms’ 
products entering the U.S. have been processed in accordance with U.S. HACCP 
requirements. Such records may include a copy of the foreign firms’ HACCP plan. EU 
requirements in this regard are more comprehensive than U.S. requirements.  
 
Implication of Tarrif barriers for India:  EU is India’s largest trading partner. According to 
the Indian Export-Import Policy 2002-2007, all marine products with a few exceptions under 
the Wildlife Protection Act 1972, can be exported free subject to pre-shipment quality 
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inspection. 90% of Indian seafood exports comprise frozen fish, shrimp and cephalopod. The 
average tariff rate in Japan, the biggest Indian seafood market, is 4.1 %. US, the second 
biggest market for Indian seafood, has just a nominal 1 % tariff duty. EU, the third biggest 
importer, has an average tariff duty of 10.2 %, followed by China, the fourth biggest, which 
has a bound tariff rate of 18 %. The EU, Japan and the US extend preferential tariff 
treatment under Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to Indian products including 
seafood. In general, tariff measures are not seen as a trade barrier by the Indian seafood 
industry to the US and Japanese markets. However, it is seen as a barrier to access some of 
the markets in developing countries, including China, as well as the EU market. India is still 
in List 1 of Annex 1 of the EC Decision 97/276/EC, amended by 99/136/EC, whereby all 
organizations exporting seafood to the EU require export-worthy certification of their 
processing facilities by an EU-nominated inspection agency. In the case of India, that agency 
is the Indian Export Inspection Council (EIC). 
 
4.2 Market Access – NonTariff Measures  
Non tariff measures include the SPS regulations and the growth in quality control 
regimes promoted particularly by the developed importing countries. The Uruguay Round 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement and the 
agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) adopted by WTO Members in 1995 have 
given a new direction to the international sea-food trade and services. These agreements are 
intended to ensure that requirements such as quality, labeling and methods of analysis 
applied to internationally traded goods are not misleading to the consumer or discriminate in 
favour of domestic producers or goods of different origin, Bostock et al. (2004). A key 
aspect has been the development of HACCP, which can impose significant costs from the 
viewpoint of the developing country supplier. SPS measures are unlikely to be relaxed and 
hence issues arise primarily in the form of mitigation and enhancement options. TBTs arise 
especially in the context of specification and labeling. Whilst the latter may assist in 
promoting (more) sustainable fishing practice they also again impose costs on producers. 
Areas such as eco-labeling are voluntary and there is scope for negotiation for those 
developing country suppliers wishing to participate. 
The SPS Agreement was set up to avoid sanitary standards being used as an 
unjustified barrier to trade by importing countries. There are several key principles including 
the sovereign right of a country to put protective measures in place, but these measures 
should not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve the appropriate level of protection. 
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The Agreement stresses that SPS measures should be scientifically based as well as the 
importance of risk assessment in determining the appropriate levels of SPS measures. Of 
crucial importance are transparency in the development and implementation of measures and 
the adoption of international standards. The SPS Agreement gives status and legal force to 
the standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The Codex Alimentarius (food 
code) was created in 1963 by FAO and WHO to develop food standards and guidelines and  
as become a global reference point for consumers, food producers and processors, national 
food control agencies and the international food trade. The SPS Agreement applies only to 
measures covering food safety, animal and plant life and human health. Other technical 
measures outside this area come within the scope of the TBT Agreement. The SPS and TBT 
Agreements are thus complementary and mutually reinforcing. The TBT Agreement tries to 
balance the trade facilitating aspects of standards against their trade distorting potential by 
obligating countries to ensure that technical regulations and standards, including packaging, 
marking and labeling requirements and procedures for assessment of conformity with 
technical regulations and standards, do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade 
or discriminate in favour of domestic producers or goods of different origins. It does this by: 
Encouraging “standard equivalence” between countries; promoting the use of international 
standards; and mandating that countries notify each other of changes in their standards via 
enquiry points. 
The EU has been at the forefront in developing food safety standards and has had a 
profound influence on the development of the seafood export industry in developing 
economies. EU standards are enforced and regulated at the country level and thus a 
restriction of exports to the EU under the regulations affects all members of the export 
community. EU legislation for all food products has recently been brought under one 
directive and the scope has been extended to all aspects of the supply chain from "farm to 
fork". This legislation supersedes the individual commodity based directives. All the steps in 
the chain from primary producers (fishermen and aquaculture units) need to take on board, in 
a more structured manner, the principles of HACCP systems and other quality assurance 
needs thus broadening the scope of the competent authority in regulating the industry. The 
need to ensure that quality assurance measures are instituted prior to arrival at the processing 
factory gate poses a major challenge to export industries, particularly for the small-scale and 
non-industrialized sectors of the industry. Of even greater concern is the fact that in order for 
the ‘farm fork’ principle to be seen to be working a system of traceability of products 
throughout the chain will need to be instituted, Bostock et al., (ibid). Imports into the USA 
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are regulated under the Federal Regulations, often referred to as 21 CFR 123 (see US FDA 
Centre for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, web site www.cfsan.fda.gov, February 2006). 
These regulations apply to domestically produced products and imports. They require that 
processors of fish and fishery products operate preventive control systems that incorporate 
the seven principles of HACCP. While new regulations with regard to quality control, such 
as HACCP, have been adopted by all major importing countries and made compulsory for 
their fish processing industries, one notable exception is Japan. While some firms in Japan 
have neither HACCP nor external suppliers. Standards for imports of fish and fishery 
products into Japan are governed by the legislation set out in the Food Sanitation Law and 
the Quarantine, Bostock et al, (ibid). 
 
Implications of Non-tarrif barriers for India: According to the Seafood Exporters Association 
of India (SEAI), since February 2002, there were several cases of rejection of Indian shrimp 
imports in the EU market on account of detecting traces of prohibited carcinogenic 
antibiotics like nitrofuran and chloramphenicol as well as other bacterial inhibitors like 
amino-glycosides and macrolides. Following the EU requirements, on 17 August 2001 India 
issued a notification specifying the limits for various antibiotics, pesticide and heavy metal 
residues in seafood products, ITN (2002). International Organization of Standardization 
(ISO) 9000 is recognized under the Export-Import Policy of Government of India. Firms, 
including seafood firms, enjoy certain privileges if they are ISO 9000 firms. Under the 1997-
2002 Export-Import Policy, Government of India, exporters with ISO 9000 were given 
Special Import License (SIL) up to 5 % of f.o.b. value. Certification against ISO 9000 is 
beginning to emerge as a major industry in India. There are many auditors with experience in 
assessment of quality management against ISO 9000, and the certifiers in India with the 
highest credibility in the international market are those under multinational companies. 
 
4.3 Fishery Subsidies 
There is considerable debate as to what fisheries subsidies actually are and what they 
include which complicates any discussion of their implications for markets, resources and 
livelihoods. World Bank (2004) defines fishery subsidies as “government actions or 
inactions that are specific to the fisheries industry and that modify – by increasing or 
decreasing – the potential profits by the industry in the short, medium or long-term”. The 
WTO’s definition of subsidies in the Agreement on SCM include: Specific financial 
transfers from state to the industry; The state foregoing normally collectable revenue (e.g. 
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tax free fuel) ; Provision of services or investments to industry; State purchases of industry 
outputs other than on commercial terms and also includes all form of state income or price 
support. Subsidies can also be categorized in relation to the rights of members to make 
complaint and take action (countervailing measures) and can be Prohibited: export 
enhancing subsidies or subsidies giving preference to domestic producers or grants tied to 
the use of domestically produced goods; and Actionable: a subsidy that may be challenged 
on the basis of causing ‘adverse effects’ to the interests of other WTO members. 
Subsidies may occur in a wide range of fishery components especially on the catch 
side and indirectly via research and development or support to poor fishing communities. 
Key issues include perceived distortions that arise especially from EU subsidies (also Japan) 
with action by other developed (and some developing) country exporters seeking their 
reduction. There is also a widespread perception and/or concern amongst developing 
countries that subsidies facilitate the continued operation of excess capacity in long distance 
fishing fleets with adverse consequences for sustainability. These aspects have led to debates 
in a number of international forums. Ongoing scope for negotiation and change may have 
important implications for the management of common pool resources in the form of fish 
stocks. The Declaration of the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference (Doha, 2001) stipulates 
that “In the context of these negotiations, participants shall also aim to clarify and improve 
WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of this sector to 
developing countries”. As a result, several proposals from WTO members aiming to reduce 
fisheries subsidies were tabled, mostly attempting to reduce or eliminate those subsidies that 
increase fishing capacity, Lem (2004).  
Most of the literature on subsidies in fisheries focuses on marine capture fisheries 
rather than aquaculture. Study like that of the OECD (2003) presents a simple qualitative 
economic model which considers the effects of giving Government Financial Transfers 
(GFT) to fisheries and suggests that in the main where there is catch control or preferably 
effective fisheries management; government financial transfers have no effect on the total 
catch or the price of fish. A key theme of a study by MRAG (2000) is the interaction 
between context and subsidy. The study argues that bilateral access agreements are the kind 
of subsidy that have most impact on developing country coastal and island states. The study 
summarizes both the negative and positive impacts from the access agreements organized 
under three headings: biomass and stocks; economic and social. These impacts are very 
context specific and vary considerably in magnitude and are difficult to isolate from other 
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factors affecting the sector. The role played by good fisheries management systems was 
highlighted in the case studies. 
 The bulk of subsidies are aimed at offshore fisheries which are largely commercial 
requiring mechanized oceangoing vessels rather than coastal or inshore fisheries that are 
largely artisanal in nature. Some of these subsidies have implications for developing country 
fisheries and livelihoods of poor people. Transparency regarding subsidies is an issue: few 
members of the WTO have complied with their obligation to report subsidies. The political 
sensitivity of the subsidies issue is highlighted by the use of euphemisms for subsidy: e.g. 
‘government financial transfers’ and ‘economic incentives’. There are also large 
inconsistencies in the data that is publicly available. There has been more attention in the 
literature on the trade effects of subsidies than their effects on sustainability. Most 
discussions of subsidies largely focus on the fisheries sectors in developed or middle-income 
countries. This is due both to their scale and the ease of access to data. Moreover, MRAG 
(ibid) stresses, subsidies on deep water fleets from developed countries “are likely to have a 
much greater impact”.  
Subsidies are also seen as a driving force in creating the overcapacity in the fishing 
industry which leads to over-fishing. According to World Bank estimates (as quoted in 
Milazzo, 1998) annual subsidies to the fisheries sector are of the order of US$14 billion to 
US$20 billion, whilst WWF (2005) estimates that fisheries subsidies amount to at least 
US$15 billion per annum. OECD (2005) states that “governments pay out some US$ 6 
billion a year to support the fisheries sector in OECD countries” in order to help manage fish 
stocks, to modernize fishing fleets, and to assist communities and regions that can no longer 
make a living out of fishing to develop other economic activities. UNEP (2004) describes the 
dual impacts of fisheries subsidies on trade and the environment, whilst WWF (2005) states 
that “once a hidden problem, inappropriate subsidies are now widely recognized as 
contributing to the profound crisis of over fishing that threatens fish stocks and human 
welfare around the world”. According to the World Bank (2004), formal access of foreign 
vessels to fishing grounds within the EEZ of fish-rich countries is usually regulated under 
fishing agreements and many fishing agreements are heavily subsidized by industrial 
countries (e.g. the EU pays 83% of the license fee, the vessels themselves only 17%). The 
type of subsidy most frequently found in developing countries is in form of bilateral or 
multilateral development projects. However, there are some fishing subsidies in developing 
countries, for example: port facilities owned and managed by the public sector;  subsidized 
lending and credit provision – in some cases in order to adopt new technology; sales tax 
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exemptions for inputs used by the fishing industry; subsidized fishing inputs in the form of 
import tax exemptions. 
 
Implication of Subsidies for India: Within the framework of the SCM Agreement, only 
export subsidies are to be treated as prohibited ones. Even if we treat the entire annual 
budget of Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA) as a prohibited 
subsidy, which may not be the case if we do a careful analysis of all their schemes, it 
amounts to less than half % of the annual seafood export value. Even though fisheries 
subsidies are small, from an overcapacity and over-fishing point of view, their role is to be 
better recognized in India. Fuel subsidies in terms of tax revenue foregone are extended in 
several Indian States to the fishing industry and it has become an important consideration for 
trawler operators to decide whether or not to undertake a particular fishing trip. Also, the 
criteria for subsidy schemes are often based on political, not legitimate social, 
considerations. In India, there are instances of misuse of subsidy schemes by fishermen 
themselves. The vessel owner would sell his fuel quota illegally in the open market and he 
would buy fuel for his fishing operation from the open market. The net benefit in such a 
transaction is in favour of the owner since the fuel quota is in his name, whereas the 
operational costs of fishing are collectively shared between the owner and crew. The owner 
thus privatizes his benefits by exclusively enjoying the proceeds of the sale of his fuel quota 
in the open market, and socializes  his costs since running costs of a fishing operation, 
including costs of fuel, are shared among the owner/s and workers and treated as common 
expense. In this case, the owner of the fishing vessel is only partially bearing the burden of 
costs of fishing operation.  
Under the SCM Agreement perhaps the most important aspect to consider in relation 
to fisheries subsidies in the Indian context, arguably in developing countries in general is the 
revenue foregone rather than government financial transfer. Irrespective of the nature of the 
fisheries, whether or not targeting high-value-low-volume, or low-value-high volume 
fisheries, there are no fee either to enter the fishery or to access fisheries resources, both for 
the rich and poor fishers. A mechanism to generate revenue by taxing fish exports, or high 
value shrimp fisheries and aquaculture, should be considered. At least one or two % of the 
landed value of fisheries, based on ownership pattern of fishing assets, should be 
appropriated through user fees.  
In the light of recent changes in legal regimes for foreign investment in India, it is 
possible for excess fishing capacity in other countries to end up in the Indian EEZ. Vessel 
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buyback schemes with the intent of reducing domestic fishing capacity (e.g. South Korea 
and Taiwan) could result in such fishing capacity ending up in Indian waters if subsidies are 
provided to vessel owners of distant water fishing nations to transfer their excess fishing 
capacity to Indian companies. They could effectively end up competing for the same 
fisheries resources with the domestic sector, mainly comprising fishing vessels below 20 m 
length. This can deny a level playing field to Indian fishing vessels and it could also give rise 
to fishing conflicts in the EEZ. There should also be protective measures within national 
legislation to prevent subsidized distant water fishing vessels from gaining unfair access to 
the national resources. 
 
4.4 Eco-labeling 
A number of fisheries related eco-labels already exist (e.g. Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC), Responsible Fisheries Society of the United States, Global Aquaculture 
Alliance) for labeling species that are judged to be sustainably fished. The objective of such 
ecolabeling programmes is to create market based incentives for better management of 
fisheries by creating consumer demand for seafood products from well managed Stocks or 
from sustainable aquaculture, Lem (ibid). The DDA also addressed labeling requirements for 
environmental purposes (i.e. eco-labels), in order to clarify the impact of eco-labeling on 
trade and examine whether WTO rules stand in the way of eco-labeling policies. 
While certification and labeling schemes may in some cases offer the opportunity of 
higher prices and access to niche markets, there are concerns (but little evidence) over the 
possible negative impacts on developing country producers (MacFadyen, 2004; Bostock et 
al, 2004). Although eco-labeled products are not yet prominent in any market, concerns are 
based around a number of issues, such as:  Legitimacy and credibility; a mismatch between 
certification requirements and the reality of tropical small-scale fisheries and potential 
distortions to existing practices and livelihoods, Gardiner and Viswanathan, (2004). 
 
Implications of Eco-labeling for India: There are several concerns about ecolabeling in 
developing countries and specifically India. Firstly, there is fear of losing access to market if 
eco-labeled fish and fish products gain greater preference in import markets. Secondly, there 
is worry about the affordability of costs associated with adjusting fisheries to comply with 
ecolabeling standards, and about costs of certification and chain of custody and whether or 
not the market, if they go for certification, can adequately compensate their higher costs. 
Thirdly, there is apprehension that fishers in the small-scale artisanal sector would lose their 
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autonomy if they have to comply with standards that are developed and applied by external 
agencies to their fish exports without taking into account the specific aspects of their 
fisheries. Fourthly, there are doubts about the practicability of eco-labeling in multi-species, 
multi-gear fisheries since the unit of certification is the fishery in its entirety. Apart from the 
above, several concerns about the implications of voluntary ecolabeling for the artisanal and 
small-scale fisheries in developing countries have been expressed, particularly in the context 
of the ecolabeling programme in fisheries, viz., the MSC, which was established in 1997, 
ICSF (1998). In the history of MSC from 1997 to 2002, for example, there are no fisheries 
from developing countries that have been certified, although there are potential candidates 
for MSC certification from developing countries including a couple of village-specific crab, 
mackerel and sardine fisheries from Tuticorin in Tamilnadu. 
 
5. Summary and Policy Implications 
Over the last couple of decades the policy space available for the developing 
countries has shrunk dramatically. And if the developed countries have their way in the 
current NAMA negotiations, it will shrink over the next decade making economic 
development in the developing world all but impossible. The impact of the Doha and HK 
round related to fisheries is not confined to NAMA. Fish related products and fishery 
services are one of the ‘sectoral initiatives’ that would see the early elimination of tariffs. 
Perversely, tariff cuts on fish products would reward those who engage in economically 
‘efficient mass exploitation and hasten the depletion of the ocean’s resources. How best the 
benefits of tariff reductions compare with the costs of non-tariff measures should be looked 
into in the context of small producers and exporters of seafood.  
Sustainable local suppliers would be forced out of their domestic market and the rape 
of the fisheries would intensify. India should also cross-link adoption of effective fisheries 
management and habitat protection measures in their national waters to greater access to the 
export market for durable goods such as textiles and garments in the US and EU markets, as 
suggested by Abrego, et al., (1999). Eliminating bad subsidies and targeting good subsidies 
for fisheries management and human development should be adopted at a regional level to 
prevent good policy regime of one country from being undermined by the bad policy regime 
of another. Given the pattern of fish production and consumption in India, market access is 
an important consideration for Indian fishers and seafood exporters. Fishers certainly benefit 
from the export market because export varieties of fish generally command a higher price in 
India.  
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Among the ETBs faced by seafood and shrimps from India pertain to the level of 
pesticides and antibiotics. Various antibiotics and chemicals like oxolinic acid and 
oxytetracyclines without any specified limit are totally banned. Consignments containing 
DDT, Aldrin and Heptachlor are bound to be rejected. The EU directive has also imposed 
process standards requiring hygiene during handling, processing and storage of marine 
products. US ban on Indian shrimp products was a unilateral restriction on environmental 
reasons. In 1996, US banned shrimps from entry unless harvested by aquaculture caught 
with turtle excluding devices, or by manual instead of mechanical means or in cold water.  
 
 
Following Policy Implications emerge from the above discussions 
 
1. The livelihood of vast masses of poor people is threatened by the ongoing 
negotiations in NAMA, most importantly of those involved in fishing. Any drastic changes 
in tariff or other rules of market access will have direct consequences for them. The 
Government must therefore give special consideration to this fact and any deliberation on 
NAMA must entail special discussions on the impact on employment and livelihood in such 
sectors. Unfortunately the Indian government has virtually accepted the contents of the 
earlier discredited as the basis for NAMA negotiations. The majority of WTO members in 
Cancun had rejected that historically, all late industrializes including the USA developed 
their industry behind high protection. The key issue concerning NAMA is that while 
developing countries protect their markets through higher tariffs, the main mode of 
protection for the developed countries is through non-tariff measures, particularly through 
the use of technical barriers. Such barriers in the developed countries are not being discussed 
simultaneously or with the same priority. Therefore a further reduction in tariffs as is being 
negotiated in NAMA will not lead to any greater market access for the developing countries 
including India but will certainly ensure greater market access for the developed countries. 
Any further steep reductions in tariffs on industrial products will accentuate the process of 
de-industrialization of fishing sector, which has already commenced with tough import 
competition being faced by many sectors in small and medium industries. Indian 
Government's mandate at such future negotiations must be comprehensively debated and 
decided by an explicit consensus to be evolved in the Parliament. 
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2. The major fishing companies in developed countries use massive factory ships to 
process their catch. Thus small countries, whose waters are the source of the fish gain donot 
benefit through jobs and development of local industry. The companies have been pressing 
their government to  cure commitments on ‘services related to fisheries’ in the GATS 
negotiations that will entrench their control over processing of the resource and of its global 
marketing and prohibit the source countries from reasserting control over the benefits from 
the resource. Small-scale fishers in India point out that their problems arise from the open 
access regime for foreign trawlers, not from subsidies. From their perspective, blanket rules 
that prohibit subsidies would restrict the right of governments to support small fishers and 
protect the food security of coastal communities. 
 
 
3.  In lieu of meeting the costs of fisheries management, seafood exporters should 
demand a reduction in tariffs on Indian seafood imports in EU and Japanese markets, where 
the average tariffs are 10.2 % and 4.1 % respectively. EU and Japan are already in the 
process of rewarding better fisheries management regimes in their seafood import markets. 
A one percent tax on exports can fetch US$12 mln. per year at current levels of export 
revenue earnings, which could provide sufficient financial resources to introduce fisheries 
management measures. A verifiable environment management system, under the ISO 14000, 
can be adopted in marine fisheries and shrimp aquaculture to demonstrate effective fisheries 
and aquaculture management measures to the import markets. As long as fishmeal continues 
to be the main feed, and brood stock comes from the wild and post larvae are collected from 
the coastal waters, shrimp aquaculture should be treated as a subset of marine fisheries.  
 
4. Some of the HACCP measures are difficult for small-scale beach-based fishers to 
meet and hence they will not be in a position to access the international market. Similarly, 
unless the State invests on behalf of the industry in expensive quality control measures, high 
compliance costs with seafood safety standards could push out small processors and 
exporters from business. How best the benefits of tariff reductions compare with the costs of 
non-tariff measures should be looked into in the context of small producers and exporters of 
seafood. Being a highly sensitive item from the health and environment point of view, 
compliance costs of the seafood industry are bound to be quite high in relation to other 
durable exports from developing countries. US lost the case at WTO when India and other 
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affected countries challenged the ban. However, the ban since 1996 adversely affects the 
Indian shrimp exports.    
 
 
5. Although there have been significant impacts on the fishing industry as a result of 
turtle protection measures there does not seem to be any significant impact on the exports of 
India as a result of MEAs. It is quite likely that, in future, MEAs might play a major role in 
the seafood exports of India if MEA obligations are to be met to maintain market access. In 
fact, fish trade is fast emerging as an area with potential conflicts between MEA obligations 
and trade rules. 
 
6. In developing countries, the fisheries administration is fragmented, with 
responsibility divided among such an array of actors (In India, around 11 ministries across 
the central and state governments) that any sectoral coherence in policy is very difficult to 
secure. Similarly, there is usually no clear policy to address the problem of over-capacity. 
For instance, the State of Goa has 1128 registered trawlers and this is far above the 
saturation point compared to the fact that the Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations following a study recommends 30 trawlers per 10 kilometers of coastline. 
Given that Goa has 105 kilometres of coastline the number of trawlers should have been 
around 315 but it has instead 1128 of them, Rodrigues (2005). A comprehensive central 
policy in this regards need to be immediately evolved.  
 
 
7. India should start in earnest putting in place a fisheries management plan. 
Subsidies to the industry to adopt and implement such a plan should be defended as non-
actionable subsidies. The EC position on non-actionable subsidies is also of relevance to 
developing countries like India since several of the proposed subsidies in this category can 
also be defended within the framework of special and differential treatment of developing 
countries. 
 
8. Under Article 4 of Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, members 
are in the process of bilateral determination of the equivalence of SPS regulations and 
regulatory processes between importing and exporting nations. (While the international 
standards of US, EU and Japan are more an extension of their domestic standards, such 
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standards in India are exclusively applied to its export market. India, for example, does not 
have any quality standard for seafood for its own domestic consumers and needs to establish 
the equivalent.  
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